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The recent House of Lords case of 
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd 
[1998] 2 All ER 577 once again raises the 
question of the extent to which a plaintiff 
will be able to recover damages in tort for 
pure economic loss suffered due to the 
negligence of another. As stated by 
Heatherington (commenting on the 
Court of Appeal decision in Amicus Curiae, 
Issue 3, at p. 21), this case concerned a 
claim by two franchisees who had 
invested their limited capital in a health 
food shop in Rugby under a franchise 
agreement \vith the defendant company.
PRACTICAL JUSTICE
'Practical justice' offers little indication to 
stressed lower court judges as to when, on a 
given set of facts, the defendant will be 
deemed to have assumed responsibility for 
the service to the other party, particularly 
where, as in all four House of Lords 
decisions, we are dealing with indirect 
recipients/beneficiaries of the service. 
Questions yet to be answered are:
  What degree of intervention will be 
necessary for a defendant to have 
assumed responsibility for the service?
  What degree of personal contact will be 
required?
  Will we be left with degrees of 
'indirectness'? and if so
  What is the distinguishing factor?
They had been sent, and had relied upon, 
financial projections prepared by the 
company, which were largely based on 
the experience of the second defendant 
(the managing director of the company)
in his own shop in Salisbury. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the 
figures were negligently prepared and 
their own business failed, having traded 
at a loss for 18 months. The defendant 
company being insolvent, the appeal 
focussed on the alleged responsibility of 
the managing director, Mr Mistlin, for 
the figures.
The House of Lords overturned the 
Court of Appeal decision ([1997] 1 
BCLC 131) which found Mr Mistlin 
liable for the misleading statements made 
to the plaintiffs. In his leading judgment, 
Lord Steyn held that under the 'extended 
Hedley Byrne principle', a director would 
only be directly responsible in tort if he 
or she assumed personal responsibility 
for the provision of information to the 
client and this had not occurred on the 
facts of the case. Mr Mistlin was 
therefore not liable for the plaintiffs' 
resulting losses.
In my view, this judgment raises two 
significant points:
(1) it recognises once again the 
importance of limited liability 
protection in company law; and
(2) it does not find such protection 
necessarily inconsistent with tortious 
liability against individual directors, 
although it is said to occur rarely.
More importantly the House of Lords 
clearly follows the more flexible 
approach, recently adopted towards pure 
economic loss, which results from the 
negligent performance of services (see 
White v Jones [1995] 2 AC at p. 207, 
Henderson v Merritt Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 
AC at p. 145 and Spring v Guardian 
Assurance pic [1994] 2 AC at p. 296).
This paper will examine the House of 
Lords' treatment of the two issues raised 
above and assess the extent to which this 
judgment increases our understanding of> o o
the central concept of 'voluntary 
assumption of responsibility'.
LIMITED LIABILITY
It is trite law that incorporation of a 
company will generally protect a director 
from personal liability and in such 
circumstances, the company will be the
correct person to sue (see Salomon v A 
Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22). Of 
course this is how the plaintiffs 
commenced the action, but the winding- 
up of the company forced them to join 
the managing director of the company to 
retain a viable chance of gaining 
compensation. Whilst Langley J, at first 
instance ([1996] 1 BCLC at p. 288), and 
the majority of the Court of Appeal did 
find Mr Mistlin personally liable to the 
plaintiffs, this was not considered to 
challenge the traditional perception of 
corporate responsibility. As Langley J 
states at p. 301:
'the status of Mr Mistlin as the controller of 
the defendant company is itself of limited 
relevance and, absent exceptional 
circumstances, he is entitled not to be deprived 
of the benefit oj limited liability when acting 
in the business of the defendant company. It 
is personal liabilityJor the tort, not the 
company, which is required to render a 
director liable.'
The key was not therefore 
responsibility via the company law 
mechanism of control, but personal 
liability whereby the conduct of the 
director established a duty of care 
towards the individual concerned.
Here, the lower courts had found such 
a duty of care, focussing on the fact that 
the figures on which the plaintiffs relied 
had been largely based on Mr Mistlin's 
own business in Salisbury (the other 
franchises had not been in operation long 
enough to give satisfactory figures). 
Equally Mr Mistlin was deemed to be a 
major 'behind the scenes' influence, 
supporting the actions of his fellow 
directors. Whilst disagreeing with theseo o
findings, the House of Lords (at p. 582) 
supported the key distinction between 
corporate responsibility and the personal 
liability of directors:
'a company is a separate entity, distinct 
from its directors, senrants or other agents . . . 
in order to establish personal liability under 
the principle of Hedley Byrne ... [t]/iere 
must have been an assumption of 
responsibility such as to create a special 
relationship with the director or employee 
himself.'
VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION 
OF RESPONSIBILITY
Undoubtedly the most interesting 
aspect of the case is the House of Lords' 
further endorsement of the concept of 
'voluntary assumption of responsibility' 
lying at the heart of the courts' analysis of 
recovery for pure economic loss in the 
law of tort. Lord Steyn (at p. 581) views 
it   while notably refraining from 
distinguishing acts from statementso o
under the extended AfeaVey ^yrne principle 
  as the:
'rafiona/isation or tecAnioue aa'opfea' 6y 
En^/isA Aw to provide a remedyJor tAe 
recovery of damages in respect of economic /oss 
caused* 6y fAe ne^/iuenf performance of 
services.'
On the facts, the House of Lords held 
that Mr Mistlin was not sufficiently 
involved in the transaction to assume 
personal responsibility towards potential 
franchisees. Indeed, he had had no 
personal contact with the plaintiffs, who 
had dealt with the franchise director and 
corresponded on the company's 
notepaper. As such, he did not go beyond 
his role as managing director. Directors 
will no doubt be relieved at this 
delineation of their responsibilities in law
The case's significance, however, lies in 
its view that the question is to be resolved 
by reference to the concept of 'voluntary 
assumption of responsibility'. This must 
be of concern to all those who are unsure 
as to the actual meaning of this concept. 
What exactly must you do to assume 
responsibility towards another? It has 
indeed been criticised, both judicially 
and academically, as a concept riddled 
with ambiguity and uncertainty (see, for 
example, Barker (1993) 109 LQR at p. 
461, Lord Griffiths in $mitA y Eric $ DusA 
[1990] 1 AC at p. 831 and 862, Lord
Oliver in Caparo p/c v DicJ^man [1990] 2 
AC 605 at p. 637 and, more recently, 
Lord Mustill dissenting in White y Jones at 
p. 288). Lord Roskill in Caparo p/c v 
DicAman (at p. 628) confesses to:
^ind*[ing] consid*era6/e d^cu/ty in pArases 
sucA as "yo/untary assumption of 
responsibi/ify" un/ess tney are to Ae explained" 
as meaning no more tnan tAe existence of 
circumstances in wAicA fne /aw wi// impose a 
/ia6i/ity upon a person maAina tne a//eaedVy 
nea/i^ent statement to tne person to wnom 
fnat statement is mad"e; in wAicA case tne 
pnrase Joes not Ae/p to Jefermine in wAaf 
circumstances tne /aw wi// impose tnaf /ia6i/ify 
or ina"eea% its scope.'
The House of Lords rejects such 
criticisms and follows Lord Goff 's 
endorsement of the concept in the Spring, 
rfenJerson and Wnite y Jones cases. 
However Lord Steyn's response is 
somewhat disappointing. Rather than 
addressing the conceptual misgivings 
expressed in relation to the practical 
application of the concept, his Lordship 
comments at 
p. 584 that:
'Coherence must sometimes jie/d" to 
practical justice . . . wAi/e tne present 
structure of Ena/isA contract /aw remains 
intact fne /aw of fort, as tne genera/ /aw, nas 
to^u/^i/ an essentia/ ^ap-/i//ina ro/e.'
This is reminiscent of Lord Goff's view 
in WAite y Jones of tort as an instrument of 
practical justice and must be subject to 
similar criticisms. 'Practical justice' offers 
little indication to stressed lower court 
judges as to when, on a given set of facts, 
the defendant will be deemed to have 
assumed responsibility for the service to 
the other party, particularly where, as in 
all four House of Lords decisions, we are 
dealing with indirect recipients/ 
beneficiaries of the service. Questions yet 
to be answered are:
" What degree of intervention will be 
necessary for a defendant to have 
assumed responsibility for the service?
» What degree of personal contact will 
be required?
* Will we be left with degrees of 
'indirectness'? and if so,
* What is the distinguishing factor?
CONCLUSION
The House of Lords' judgment in 
W//iams raises interesting points of law 
and highlights the current trend in the 
development of recovery for pure 
economic loss in the law of tort. Whilst 
affirming that directors' responsibility in 
tort will be confined to 'rare' occasions 
when he or she assumes personal 
responsibility beyond the role of director, 
the House of Lords turns once again to 
the concept of 'voluntary assumption of 
responsibility' as the key resolving 
principle. This will be determined 
according to the facts of each case. Some 
concern must, however, be expressed as 
to whether this provides adequate 
guidance to lower courts and litigants 
alike. What key factors mark out an 
assumption of responsibility? When will 
a director need to ensure care is taken 
not to be negligent? Should tort lawo o
intervene to resolve the perceived 
deficiencies of contract law or should 
contract law, with the assistance of 
legislation, be left to put its own house in 
order? In my view, W//iams stands as a 
missed opportunity to address the 
concerns underlying 'voluntary 
assumption of responsibility' and give 
much-needed clarity to this area of 
law. @
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